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Abstract 
 The issue of fiscal federalism has for quite some time engaged the 
attention of scholars and policy makers in contemporary Nigeria. Several 
arguments have been put forward on the economic and political desirability 
for the practice of fiscal federalism in a country. While the political 
arguments are largely based on the heterogeneous characteristics of the 
different regions making up the country, the economic justification is usually 
based on the need to promote efficiency in the use of national resources. This 
paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic 
performance in Nigeria. The study employs three measures of fiscal 
decentralization namely revenue measure, expenditure measure and 
simultaneity measure to determine the extent, and the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on macroeconomic performance over the period 1980 to 
2010. The overall objective of this study is to analyze the empirical effects of 
fiscal decentralization on some selected indicators of macroeconomic 
performance in Nigeria. The indicators include: economic growth, inflation 
rate, interest rate, and exchange in Nigeria. The Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) estimator with lagged decentralization variables was employed using 
the E-views, version 7.0 to provide analytical support. The empirical 
findings are quite informative and offer evidence that the central objective of 
this study has been empirically investigated. There is, indeed, a connection 
between fiscal federalism and macroeconomic performance in Nigeria over 
the study period. The study suggests that faster economic growth may 
constitute additional benefit of fiscal decentralization beyond those already 
well recognized. This finding conforms to a strand of the literature that 
establishes links between fiscal decentralization, public sector efficiency and 
macroeconomic stability.  
European Scientific Journal October  2014 edition vol.10, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
458 
 
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal decentralization, Macroeconomic 
Performance and Vector Autoregressive Estimator 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 Fiscal decentralization constitutes an important topical issue in many 
developed and less developed countries. Many countries across the globe 
have devoluted fiscal powers from the central down to lower level 
governments practically to improve resource  allocation and spending among 
the tiers of government (Oates,1972; Tanzi,1995). Fiscal decentralization is 
an integral component of federal system of government63. In the process of 
decentralizing fiscal responsibilities among the layers of government, there is 
need to understand the menu of the functions and instruments to be 
centralized and the one to be placed under the spheres of decentralized levels 
of government. As a subject which falls under public finance, fiscal 
federalism addresses the executive arm of the public sector. It explores, both 
in normative and positive terms, the roles of the different levels of 
government and the ways in which they relate to one another through such 
instruments as intergovernmental grants. 
 Federalism is essentially about multilevel government structure, 
rather than within a level structure of government. Each level of government 
can be viewed as an institution with definite functions to perform (Rivlin, 
1991). The conventional wisdom in economics is that all functions allocated 
to government should be those that the market is not able to perform in the 
efficient allocation of resources, equitable distribution of income, and 
economic stability and growth (Varian, 1990; Layard and Walters, 1978). 
There are different forms of federalism. The prominent ones are fiscal, 
political and administrative. Decentralized systems of government give rise 
to a set of fiscal exigencies as enshrined in fiscal federalism. 
 Since 1990s there has been a resurgence of interest in the 
macroeconomic performance of developing countries. A prominent element 
in the policy advice given to developing countries to enhance growth and 
development potentials is the need to restructure the public sector to make it 
more responsive to efficient and equitable provision of public services to 
ensure stable macroeconomic performance(Aigbokhan,1999)64. Recent 
                                                          
63 In a federal structure, governmental  functions and powers were exercised in consonance 
with the dictates of  the constitution. Federal structure comprises of three tiers of 
government namely, central, state and local. Each of these governments have their 
respective constitutional limitations.   
64 A trend that has emerged from this public sector restructuring is the devolution of 
spending and revenue-raising responsibilities to lower levels of government not only in 
federal systems, but also in many unitary countries. This trend is a reflection of the 
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interest in fiscal decentralization fuelled the debate about public sector 
reforms in general, and the role of sub-national governments in 
macroeconomic policy-making process. In all countries, power is necessarily 
divided to some extent between the central and other levels of government. 
The extent of division of power has important implications for the 
functioning of the public sector and efficient provision of services. Division 
of policy-making powers influences not only delivery of services but also 
their financing that in turn determines macroeconomic performance of 
countries. Fiscal decentralization requires that sub-central units of the 
government must make decisions about provision of public services at the 
lower level (Yilmaz, 1999). The important question that remains to be 
answered is whether lower-level governments’ spending increases and 
imposes constraints on macroeconomic stability. In general, macroeconomic 
variables such as prices, money supply, interest rate, unemployment, foreign 
exchange rate may be subjected to violent fluctuations which may 
compromise the growth of the national economy and promote an unstable 
macroeconomic environment. This is of particular importance in the 
performance of the stabilization function, usually assigned to the central 
government. It can be seen that issues of fiscal federalism affect national 
development and macroeconomic stability.  
 Nigeria's experience with fiscal federalism started in 1954. Despite 
over fifty years of experience with fiscal federalism, the country is faced 
with many challenges on macroeconomic management, poor output growth 
rate, high inflation rate, and weak balance of payment position. The absence 
of good macroeconomic governance has also raised the problematic issue of 
credibility in public policy. Relevant questions central to this study is could 
fiscal federalism challenges be responsible for poor macroeconomic 
performance in Nigeria? What are the hindrances promoting the principles 
and practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria? From independence in 1960 till 
date, Nigeria’s fiscal management system has neither been efficient nor 
equitable. Indeed it manifested a wide spectrum of vulnerability, ethnicity, 
language, region and religion interactively forming Nigeria’s matrix of 
cultural pluralism65.  
 The problems of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal 
relations are of wide-spread concern in developing countries. Much of the 
                                                                                                                                                     
movement towards participatory democracy and the need to provide public goods and 
services that meet the preferences of people in each locality.  
65The Federal Government has, for more than four decades assumed certain responsibilities 
which rightly belonged to the lower tiers of government and, in the process, had 
compromised efficiency in public expenditure management, resulting in high levels of 
unsustainable overall deficits, high inflation, slow economic growth and poor external sector 
balance (Ike,1981; Anyanwu, 1995; Aigbokhan 1999; Chete, 1998). 
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established literature of fiscal federalism has been explicitly or implicitly 
oriented toward the institutions and policy issues that arise within developed 
countries, particularly Canada and the United States (Wildasin, 1997; Artis, 
2006; Austin 2006). There is no consensus in the literature on the effects of 
fiscal federalism on macroeconomic performance in developed and 
developing countries. The literature on the potential macroeconomic effects 
of fiscal federalism is quite vast but mixed. Decentralization may improve 
allocative efficiency, but it may also make stabilization policies more 
difficult to carry out (Prud’homme, 1994; Tanzi, 1995). While there are 
several reasons that fiscal decentralization has been adopted around the 
world the common motive of many is that fiscal decentralization is 
considered to have the potential to improve the performance of the public 
sector. The theory of fiscal federalism holds that for certain public goods, the 
decision to provide these goods in a decentralized fashion can increase 
efficiency and accountability in resource allocation (Bird and Vaillancourt, 
1998 as cited in Kwom, 2003; Oates, 1993). 
 However recent studies have held that the conventional argument that 
decentralized provision of public goods will increase efficiency in resource 
allocation may not be applicable in developing countries (Bahl and Linn, 
1994; Prud’homme, 1995). Recent experience with fiscal decentralization in 
numerous developing and transition economies has led many observers to 
question whether fiscal decentralization undermines macroeconomic 
stability. In several countries, central government transfers to lower-level 
governments have increased fiscal deficits at the central level, creating 
pressures on central banks to monetize additional debt and thus jeopardizing 
stability. In other countries, central governments attempting to control their 
deficits have reduced transfers to lower-level governments, creating fiscal 
distress at lower levels (Wellisch and Wildasin, 1996). Despite the 
controversy concerning the effects of fiscal decentralization in developing 
countries, fiscal decentralization continues to take place in developing 
countries as well as in developed ones.    
 There has been a growing body of literature that deals with fiscal 
decentralization in developing and transition economies. The emerging 
literature clearly departs from the broad principles and practices of fiscal 
federalism to the quality of macroeconomic governance because it perceives 
the federal system as possessing high potentials for macroeconomic 
mismanagement and instability (Prud’homme, 1994). Many of the empirical 
literature on Nigeria have been concerned with explaining the pattern of 
intergovernmental relations (Mbanefor, 1993; Sarah et al, 2003) or providing 
an impressionistic view within the context of political economy of possible 
consequences of such relationships (Ekpo, 1994). A notable exception is the 
work of Aigbokhan (1999) and Chete (1998) which investigate the 
European Scientific Journal October  2014 edition vol.10, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
461 
relationship between fiscal federalism and economic growth. Missing from 
the empirical literature on Nigeria is an empirical analysis of the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic performance. In an attempt to fill 
this void, this study is therefore an extension of previous studies that are 
based on one macroeconomic variable.  
 The broad objective of this study is to investigate the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization federalism and macroeconomic performance 
in Nigeria. The specific objectives are to identify the underlying factors 
promoting true practice of fiscal federalism; ascertain the extent of fiscal 
decentralization; and analyze the empirical effects of fiscal decentralization 
on some selected indicators of macroeconomic performance in Nigeria. 
Apart from the introduction, section two contains the review of related 
literatures. Section three contains the stylized facts explaining Nigeria's 
fiscal federalism while section four proposes the theoretical framework and 
methodology for the study. Section five provided the empirical findings and 
discussion of results. The last section concludes the study. 
 
2.0 A Brief Review of Literature 
 The basic foundations of fiscal federalism were laid by Kenneth 
Arrow, Richard Musgrave and Paul Samuelson. Samuelson’s two important 
papers (1954, 1955) on the theory of public goods, Arrows discourse (1970) 
on the roles of the public and private sectors and Musgrave’s book (1959) on 
public finance provided the framework for what became accepted as the 
proper role of the state in the economy. Within this framework, three roles 
were identified for the government sector namely allocative, stabilization and 
distributive. By this classification, the central government is saddled with the 
responsibilities of stabilization and distribution functions while allocation 
functions are shared among the different levels of government. It has been 
argued at the theoretical level, that the central government would be in a 
better position to perform the distribution and stabilization functions as well 
as provide national public goods (Oates, 1972; Musgrave and Musgrave, 
1989; Cremer et al 1995; Taiwo, 1999). All these functions would be 
inefficiently performed at the local government level due to difficulty in 
appropriating the full social benefits of the programme undertaken at that 
level, and the tendency towards the free rider problem.  
 There are two complementary issues in fiscal federalism namely tax 
assignment and revenue sharing. Tax assignment falls under the three levels 
of governments. Central collection of taxes is more consistent with the 
pursuit of distribution and stabilization functions of government, and also the 
provision of national public goods, all of which are assigned to the central 
government. This system is expected to generate economies of scale in tax 
administration and prevent revenue loss due to the mobility of taxpayers 
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from one locality to another if such taxes were collected locally. On the other 
hand, a decentralized system of tax collection would be more likely to make 
spending decisions at the grass root level more compatible with available 
resources. It could, therefore, promote accountability and responsibility as 
well as the efficient provision of local public goods. This system also 
encourage fiscal autonomy and tax competition among localities. 
Decentralization of functions should be matched by decentralization of 
revenue collection66.  
 A number of factors have been cited for the negative impact of 
decentralization on growth. These include: corruption, limited fiscal 
arrangements, low quality of bureaucracies and absence of skilled manpower 
(Prud’homme,1995; Tanzi,1995 and Nelson,2006). The experience of many 
developing countries suggest that sub national governments are likely to 
contribute to the aggravation of macroeconomic problems, or make it 
difficult to correct such problems (Tanzi, 1995). This is particularly so in 
countries where expenditure assignment is not matched with taxing 
assignment. In such situations,  sub national governments tend to accumulate 
debt. The argument in favour of decentralization stems from motivation for 
enhanced efficiency, accountability, and autonomy. According to Stigler 
(1957), a representative government works best when it is closer to the 
people. Carrying Stigler’s argument further, Oates (1972) formulates the 
decentralization theorem as ‘each public service should be provided by the 
jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that would 
internalize benefits and costs of such provision. Yilmaz (1999) in a study on 
fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic performance argues that the 
correlation coefficient between local governments spending and GDP partly 
supports decentralization theorem. In the developed countries, where local 
governments are more responsive to constituents, there is a high positive 
correlation between GDP per capita and local government spending. On the 
other hand, in developing countries, the correlation coefficient is very low, 
even negative.                                 
 Davoodi and Zou (1998) examine the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on growth. Fiscal decentralization is measured as spending 
by sub national governments as a fraction of total government spending. 
They separated their full sample of 46 countries over the 1970-1989 period 
                                                          
66 Fiscal federalism literature suggests that expenditure assignment should precede tax 
assignment. This is because tax assignment would generally be guided by expenditure 
requirement of different levels of government and these cannot be worked out in advance of 
expenditure responsibilities. Absence of tax assignment would result in dependence on the 
federal government by lower levels of government. It is recognized, however, that the two 
assignments need not correspond exactly. Intergovernmental transfers could be used to make 
up the difference (Aigbokhan, 1999). 
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into developing and developed countries and found a negative relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the world (full 
sample) and developing country samples while the developed country 
sample showed a positive, but not significant effect. One of their 
explanations for the negative effect of fiscal decentralization on growth in 
developing countries is that “efficiency gains from fiscal decentralization, 
the strongest argument in its favour, may not materialize for developing 
countries since revenue collection and expenditure decisions by local 
governments may still be constrained by the central government. Bruecker 
(1999) used an overlapping generations (OLG) model to show that, in a 
dynamic context, fiscal federalism affects the incentive to save. It does so by 
replacing a common tax burden, associated with uniform national provision 
of the public good z, with head-tax burdens that differ between young and 
old consumers, who live in separate jurisdictions where z is provided at 
different levels in response to age-dependent demands. Fiscal federalism thus 
alters the time path of after-tax income over the life cycle, thereby affecting 
the economy’s level of saving. Because Bruecker’s analysis relies on the 
traditional Diamond (1965) OLG model, this difference in saving alters the 
economy’s steady-state capital intensity without affecting its growth rate, 
except in the transition between the “unitary” system (where a common z 
level is provided nationally) and a federalist system. 
 Evidence from empirical literature show that fiscal structure affects 
the successful operation of fiscal federalism. Wantchekon and Asadurin 
(2002) in a study report that in the case of Nigeria, the dependence on 
transfers is a by product of the dominance of oil in the Nigerian economy 
beginning in the 1970’s. The states that are the highest recipients of transfers 
(oil rents) have experienced increased income inequality and display poor 
economic indicators, which suggest that there is little “meaningful 
accountability”, while oil-producing states have also displayed poor social 
and economic indicators due to inadequate transfer system. Surprisingly, 
states that have benefited the least from oil rents have fared much better. It is 
also worth noting that despite earning over $300 billion in the last twenty 
five years from oil windfalls, the per capita income in Nigeria today is 
around the same level as it was in 1970 due partly to the absence of tight 
fiscal controls and corruption in both the public and private sector.  
 In line with the argument put forth here, Rodden and Wibbles (2001), 
attempt to explain the variations in economic performance of countries 
typically categorized as federal. They hypothesize that federalism effect on 
economic outcomes are conditioned by the strength of party systems, the 
degree to which countries are decentralized fiscally and the actual revenue 
autonomy of sub national units. They find in their sample of fifteen countries 
(including Nigeria) for the period 1978-1996, that deficit and inflation rates 
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were conditioned by the underlying fiscal and party structure. In particular, 
they find that fiscal decentralization has a negative relationship with inflation 
and deficits, and this is strengthened when state governments have higher 
levels of revenue autonomy. When dependent on transfers, deficits and 
inflation increase and this effect is reinforced the more a country is fiscally 
decentralized. Theoretical reason why vertical fiscal imbalance (transfer 
dependence) might distort  economic performance is that internal revenue 
and grants are viewed differently; “intergovernmental grants alter 
perceptions and beliefs about the levels of local expenditure that can be 
maintained”.  
 The literature dealing with the effects of fiscal decentralization on 
fiscal size of government is extensive. Efforts have been concentrated on 
testing Wagner’s Law which relates to the rising share of the public sector in 
the economy in the course of economic development. The factors which have 
been identified as affecting the growth of government expenditure and the 
fiscal deficit in LDCs include government revenue instability, degree of 
government’s participation in the economy and growth of government 
revenue. Morrison (1982), and Peacock and Wiseman (1961) explain the 
growth of government expenditure in terms of the increase in the activities of 
the different tiers of government. They argue that centralization of public 
expenditure is accompanied by rising per capita national income because of 
the economies of scale in public activities and the broad-based superior 
taxing powers that result from the centralization of government functions. 
Similarly, Martin and Lewis (1956) argue that greater centralization of 
government functions is important in LDCs because of the scarcity of 
qualified personnel. Wheare (1963) is of the view that for developing 
countries, a highly decentralized government may be too expensive and a 
waste of badly needed funds. However, as a country grows in size and 
income, the centralization of all government activities becomes more and 
more difficult to execute efficiently. For efficiency reasons, it may be 
necessary to decentralize fiscal functions.  
 Ubogu (1982), in a study based on cross-sectional data of Nigeria’s 
former twelve states find that variations in fiscal decentralization among the 
states are highly influenced by factors such as federal government transfers 
or allocations, degree of urbanization and share of agriculture in each state’s 
capital formation. Aigbokhan (1999) using a similar method for Nigeria 
during the period 1970-1997 find that there is high concentration of fiscal 
resources in the federal government, while the other tiers of government 
experienced persistent fiscal deficits. Joulfaian and Marlow (1990) tested the 
decentralization hypothesis using a cross-sectional methodology, and find 
evidence in support of the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) “Leviathan” 
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hypothesis67 that fiscal decentralization serves as a constraint on the 
behaviour of the revenue-maximizing government. Therefore, the argument 
in favour of fiscal decentralization is twofold: (1) fiscal decentralization will 
increase competition among the local governments which will ultimately 
limit the size of the public sector; and (2) decentralization will increase 
efficiency because local governments have better information about their 
residents’ needs than the central government. Ojo and Okunrounmu (1992) 
investigate the role of fiscal decentralization in developing countries with 
specific reference to Nigeria and observe that the Nigeria’s narrow revenue 
base could not withstand the weight of public expenditure and investment. 
They find that fiscal decentralization increased macroeconomic instability 
and the public debt burden escalated. Other notable studies on fiscal 
performance of Nigeria include Oyejide (1972), Ariyo (1993), Egwaikhide et 
al. (1994), Anyanwu (1999), among others. Despite, the contradictory 
findings, economic reforms in the transition countries and its effect on the 
rest of the world fuelled the debate on the appropriate role of the state and its 
institutions in the last decade. Such a debate on public sector reforms in 
developing and transition countries reinstated the interest in fiscal 
decentralization. 
 
3.0 Stylized Facts on Nigeria's Fiscal Federalism   
 There has been a limited degree of fiscal decentralization in Nigeria 
since 1954 when the country adopted federalism. At independence in 1960, 
the constitution gave the federal government exclusive powers over the 
imposition of some taxes. The regional governments were then left with the 
power to impose any other tax not reserved for the federal government. 
However, when the military assumed power in 1966, the fiscal relationship 
changed as a result of the suspension of the constitution68. This, in effect, 
empowered the federal government to impose any tax, thereby curtailing the 
fiscal powers of the states.  State governments, therefore, became 
administratively and financially dependent on the federal government as the 
revenues from regional or state taxes remained grossly inadequate to meet 
their expenditure responsibilities. Therefore, states had to fall back on their 
share of federally collected revenues, but the federal government retained 
fiscal supremacy. 
 Revenue allocation in Nigeria has always been subject to 
controversy, and various revenue allocation commissions have been set up to 
                                                          
67 The Leviathan model predicts that the overall size of the public sector should inversely 
vary with decentralization. 
68 The legal, administrative and political relationship between the federal and the state 
governments were based on Decree No. 1 of 1966 which gave the federal government 
unlimited powers to legislate on “any matter whatsoever”. 
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look into the allocation formula. Some categories of revenue were allocated 
to the states and local government and revenues that do not fall under this 
category are federally collected and paid into the federation account for 
sharing. The revenue is shared vertically among the three tiers of 
government, and horizontally among the units within the same level of 
government. The vertical sharing revenue formular is in the following 
percentages; 48.5: 24.0 and 20.0% to federal, state and local governments, 
respectively while the balance of 7.5% is allocated to special funds. The 
horizontal counterparts is based on the following principles including 
equality, population, internal revenue effort, and geographical size among 
others.  
 Revenues accruing to the three levels of government consists of tax 
and non-tax financial flows which are derived from internal and external 
sources. The internal sources are those revenue heads assigned to the three 
levels of government by the Constitution, while the external source is made 
up of statutory revenue allocation, discretionary grants and value added tax 
(VAT). The different formulas that have been used for revenue allocation 
have consistently increased the financial powers of the federal government 
against the other levels of government, The allocation of the most productive 
income-elastic taxes to the federal government have made the centre 
financially stronger than the states and local governments. The principal 
effect of this is the increasing fiscal dependence of the lower governments on 
federally collected revenue (both statutory and non-statutory), and their 
inability to meet the cost of functions assigned to them.  
 The overview of the profile and challenges of fiscal federalism in 
Nigeria have been presented to show deviation from the true practice of 
fiscal federalism in Nigeria. The main issue is that if the three tiers of 
government in a federal system were to simultaneously intervene in a market 
economy, without coordination, and perform the role of the public sector, the 
situation will be chaotic. Therefore, in order to ensure sustainable growth 
and national development, it is necessary to understand and institutionalize 
the policy issues of fiscal federalism. Ideally, each tier of government should 
be assigned revenue/tax sources that are commensurate with its 
responsibilities. However, it is important to reconcile considerations of 
efficiency (minimization of resource cost) with equity (rationalization of 
expenditure and revenue needs). It is in this light that certain major 
principles become imperative: progressive redistributive taxes should be 
central; taxes suitable for economic stabilization should be central while 
lower level taxes should be cyclically stable; tax bases distributed equally 
between jurisdictions should be centralized; taxes on mobile factors of 
production are best administered at the centre; residence-based taxes such as 
excise duties or sales tax on consumption goods to consumers are best suited 
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for the local level; and benefit taxes and user charges might be appropriately 
used at all levels (Musgrave 1959). 
 In assigning tax/revenue powers, it is also important to distinguish 
between those revenue powers which are exercisable by one level of 
government and the revenue which accrue to that level of government alone 
(“independent revenue”), and those exercisable by a level of government, but 
whose revenues accrue to that level of government as well as others. Table1 
presents the assignment of tax powers in the Nigerian federal system. Table 
2 show Nigeria’s major taxes and the accompanying jurisdiction and right to 
revenue. Table 3 indicates that all the major sources of revenue-petroleum 
profits tax, import duties, excise duties, mining rents and royalties, and 
company income tax-come under the jurisdiction of the federal  government. 
With the exception of personal income tax (at the state level) and property 
tax (at the local government level), the state and local governments have 
jurisdiction over minor and poor yielding revenue sources. As a result of the 
concentration of revenue rights and jurisdiction at the national level, sub 
national governments have become dependent on national transfers for their 
expenditures. Indeed, there has been a high dependency on statutory 
allocations from the federal to the state level.  
 It is widely documented that the federal government enjoys a greater 
ability to raise revenues to meet its functional expenditure obligations than 
do state and local governments. Tax assignment in Nigeria had changed at 
different periods essentially as determined by the federal structure in 
operation. Between 1966 and 1999, the fiscal decentralization arrangement 
changed remarkably, following the intervention of the military69. The 
military government introduced some measures which systematically eroded 
the revenue potentials of the lower tiers of government. The combination of 
military rule, civil war, and an arrangement whereby all the proceeds from 
oil goes to the federal government totally reversed the situation in the early 
1960s when there was substantial revenue and expenditure decentralization. 
Today, what exist is a situation in which all fiscal resources are centralized at 
the federal level which is then transferred to the states and local governments 
through the federation account and the local government joint account, 
respectively. This situation has been compounded by shifts in fiscal 
responsibilities from the federal to other levels of government, especially the 
                                                          
69The measures introduced by the military include: promulgation of Decree No. 9 of 1971, 
transferring mining and royalties to the Federal Government; centralization of marketing 
boards, and their eventual dissolution; collection and retention of company income tax and 
excise duties. The introduction of value-added tax (VAT) in 1994 to replace the sales tax 
that had been previously assigned to states. The legislation and administration of the new tax 
was assigned to the Federal Government as agent of the federating units. 
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local governments (for example primary education and primary health care, 
among others). From the above analysis, it is clear that the Federal 
Government had assumed a near absolute control of revenue matters in the 
country. Table 3 presents figures on total revenues collected by different tiers 
of government. The table reveals that from 1980 to 2011, between 94 and 99 
% of the total revenues are collected by the federal government. The Federal 
government continues to sustain this feat by tinkering with the rights of tiers 
of government to collect revenues.  
Table1: Nigeria’s Tax Jurisdiction, 1999 
Federal Government State Government Local Government 
1.  Companies Income 
Tax 
Personal Income Tax (on 
residents of the State) 
Tenement rate 
2. Petroleum Profits Tax Capital Gains Tax (on 
individuals only) 
Shop and Kiosks Rates 
3. Value Added Tax Stamp Duties (on individuals) 
only 
Liquor Licence Fees 
4.Education Tax (on  
Companies only) 
Road taxes, e.g., Vehicle 
Licences 
Slaughter slab fees 
5. Capital Gains Tax (on      
    Corporate Bodies and  
    Abuja Residents) 
Betting and Gaming Taxes Marriage, Birth and Death 
Registration Fees 
6. Stamp Duties (on  
    Corporate Bodies)       
Business Premises and 
Registration Levies 
Street name, Registration 
Fees (excluding state 
capital) 
7. With-holding Tax (on  
     Companies) 
Development levy (Max of  
#100 per annum on taxable 
individuals only) 
Market/Motor Park Fees 
(excluding State owned 
markets) 
8. Personal Income Tax 
(on 
    personnel of the Armed  
    Forces, Police, External 
    Affairs Ministry and  
    Residents of Abuja ) 
      
Street Name Registration 
Fees (State Capital Only) 
Domestic Animal Licence 
Fees 
9. Mining Rents and  
    Royalties 
Right of Occupancy Fees 
(State Capital Only) 
Bicycle, Trucks, Canoe,  
Wheelbarrow, Carts and 
Canoe Fees 
10. Customs Duties (i.e.,  
      Import Duties and 
      Export Duties 
Market fees (where market is 
financed by State 
Government) 
Right of Occupancy fees 
(excluding State Capital) 
11. Excise Duties Miscellaneous revenues (e.g., 
rents on property) 
Cattle Tax 
 
Sources: Federal Ministry of Finance, and 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and other Legislation to date 
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Table 2:  Nigeria’s Major Tax Jurisdictions and Right to Revenue (1999) 
Types of tax Jurisdiction Right to Revenue 
Law 
 
Admin. And Collection 
1. Import duties 
2. Excise duties 
3. Export duties 
4. Mining rents and  
    royalties 
5.Petroleum profit tax 
6. Companies income  
    tax 
7. Capital gains tax 
8.Personal income tax 
   (other than those 
     listed in 9) 
9.Personal income tax: armed forces, 
external affairs officers, non- 
residents of the Fed. 
Capital Territory and 
Nigerian Police Force 
10. Licences fees on 
    television and 
    wireless radio 
11. Stamp duties 
12.Capital transfer tax 
      (CCT) 
13. Value added tax 
14. Pools betting and  
     other betting taxes 
15. Motor vehicle and  
     drivers’ licenses 
16. Entertainment tax 
17. Land registration  
     and survey fees 
18. Property taxes and 
      rating 
19.Market and trading 
     licence and fees 
  
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
 
Federal 
Federal 
 
Federal 
 
 
Federal 
 
 
 
 
 
Federal 
 
 
Federal 
Federal 
 
Federal 
Federal 
 
State 
 
State 
State 
 
State 
 
State 
 
State 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
Federal 
 
Federal 
Federal 
 
Federal/States 
 
 
States 
 
 
 
 
 
Federal 
 
 
Local 
Federal/States 
 
States 
Federal/States 
 
States 
 
States 
States 
 
States 
 
Local 
 
Local 
federation account 
federation account 
federation account 
federation account 
 
federation account 
federation account 
 
States 
 
 
Federal 
 
 
 
 
 
Federal 
 
 
Local 
States 
 
States 
Federal/States/Local 
 
States 
 
States 
States 
 
States/Local 
 
Local 
 
Local 
Note:   The peculiar status of the Federal Capital Territory has not been  taken consideration in this table. 
Source:  Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and other legislations to date 
Table 3: Average Collected Government Revenues by Tiers of Government , 1980-2011 
DESCRIPTION  
 
 
1980-84 
(# million) 
1985-
1989 
(# 
million)           
1990-1994 
(#million) 
1995-1999 
(#million) 
2000-2007     
(#  million) 
2008-2011 
(#  million) 
1.Total    Federally 
collected Revenue 
12,343.94 
 
26,898.78 156,845.5 595,838.4 3,699,174 8,992,645 
2.States Internally Gen. 
Revenues 
 87.2   1,836.06     5,568.72   25,430.22      24,179.2 540,579.8 
3.Total Nigerian Govt. 
Revenues (1+2) 
12431.14 28,734.84 162,414.22 621,268.62 3,823,353.2 9,533,224.8 
4.Fed. Collected Rev. as 
% of Total 
       99        94          97          96             97 94 
5.% of States collected 
revenue 
 
       1          6            3            4               3 6 
6. Number of 
Regions/States 
       19        20          28          34             36 36 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report & Statement of Accounts (Various Issues). 
European Scientific Journal October  2014 edition vol.10, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
470 
 From the above analysis, it is evident that state and local 
governments depend heavily on the federation account for more than 80% of 
their total revenue as a result of their narrow tax bases and inefficient tax 
administration machinery. Internal tax bases of state governments include 
personal income tax, capital gains tax, stamp duties, and property tax among 
others. While states have the power to determine the rate and tax bases of 
some of these taxes, the federal government determines the rates and bases 
for all other taxes, including personal income tax. All the taxes assigned to 
the federal government are those that yield the highest revenues. The taxes 
under the state and local governments like the personal income tax are set by 
the federal government. Theoretically, this practice can be defended on the 
basis of unequal distribution of natural resources, especially crude oil, and 
the need for the federal government to have certain stabilization instruments 
at its disposal. 
 
4.0 Theoretical Framework and Methodology  
 There is a growing consensus in the literature about the mechanisms 
that create the links between fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic 
performance (Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005; Brandt and Zhu, 2000; Jin et al. 
1999; Lardy, 1998; Naughton, 1995; Yusuf, 1994, Aigbokhan, 1999). Fiscal 
decentralization is expected to shift tax revenues from the central 
government to sub national governments. Sub national governments infused 
with new revenue, begin to build local infrastructure. This infrastructure 
encourages both public and private investment. Private firms tend to respond 
to the increased local infrastructure with higher rates of investment than the 
public enterprises, given their greater efficiency. As the public enterprises 
attempt to keep up with the rates of investment of private enterprises, a 
further adjustment occurs. The public enterprises, observing the increased 
rate of capital formation of the private enterprises increase their own rate of 
investment beyond the rate that would be optimal. The public enterprises are 
able to do so because they have access to bank loans that are not justified on 
economic grounds. Also the private enterprises increase their borrowing to 
expand business operations because of the improvement in local 
infrastructure. Increased economic activities at sub national level results in 
monetary expansion. The implication of this is that the resulting monetary 
expansion would have effects on indicators of macroeconomic performance; 
inflation rate, interest rate, exchange rate, and economic growth. The effects 
of the monetary expansion on these macroeconomic variables could be 
positive or negative. This study assumes that the monetary expansion would 
lead to increased inflation and interest rate, depreciation of the exchange 
rate, while the higher output of both the public and private enterprises cause 
an increase in aggregate real income (that is economic growth).   
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4.1 Fiscal Federalism and Economic Growth 
 Given the basic foundations for the initial theory of Fiscal 
Federalism, the study adopts the Keynesian School of thought approach as 
the theoretical basis for the relationship between fiscal federalism and 
economic growth. The two-sector production function framework (Ram, 
1986; Barro, 1990) is adopted for this study70. The model developed in this 
study is an extension from other studies (Ram, 1986 and Aigbokhan, 1996; 
1999). The model assumes that the economy consists of two broad sectors, 
public (G) and private (P) whose output depends on labour (L) and capital 
(K). In addition, the output of G exercises some externality effect on output 
in P. The production function of the economy is thus: 
Y = f (L, KP , KG )                                                                                                                  (1) 
 where the subscripts denote sectoral inputs: 
 KP =  private capital per labour 
 KG  =  public capital per labour 
 The production functions of the respective sectors are thus: 
YP  =  P(LP, KP, G)                                                                                                                (2) 
YG  = G(LG, KG )                                                                                                                   (3) 
 Total inputs are given as: 
LT = LP + LG                                                                                                                          (4) 
KT = KP + KG                                                                                                                         (5) 
 Total output Y is given as the sum of sectoral output or a function of 
sectoral inputs: 
Y = YP + YG                                                                                                                                                                                        (6) 
Y = P(LP, KP, G) + G(LG, KG)                                                                                                (7a) 
Y =  f(LT, KT, GT)                                                                                                                  (7b) 
 The model further assumes that the public sector comprises of three 
subsectors and, by extension, that public spending is carried out by three 
levels of government: federal (f), state (s), and local (m). 
 Thus: 
Y = a0 + LT + KT + GT + µ                                                                                                     (8) 
 The study assumes that the size of government tends to influence 
growth rate  and that fiscal decentralization tends to reduce the size of 
government. Theoretically, fiscal decentralization is expected to foster 
growth through allocative efficiency and efficiency of service delivery. The 
nature of intergovernmental fiscal arrangement is therefore expected to 
influence output of G. By introducing fiscal decentralization (FDC) as a 
policy variable into the model on the basis of equation (8) 
Gt = f(FDC)                                                                                                                        (9) 
                                                          
70 It provides an appealing set of models for investigating the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and macroeconomic performance indicators such as growth of aggregate 
output, inflation rate, interest rate, and exchange rate. The model assumes that 
macroeconomic performance is influenced by policy variables other than the technical 
relationship between capital and labour (Ram, 1986; Barro, 1990; Aigbokhan, 1999). 
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 Equation (7b); Y= f(Lt, Kt, Gt) becomes 
Y = f(Lt, Kt, FDCt)                                                                                                             (10) 
 The study postulates that output (growth), is positively affected by 
money supply (MS). Introducing money supply into the model, equation (10) 
becomes; 
Y = f(Lt, Kt, MSt, FDCt )                                                                                                     (11) 
 Equation (11) is the estimated basic growth equation. Its explicit 
form is: 
Y =  α 0 + α 1Lt + α 2Kt + α 3MSt + α 4FDCt + µ t                                                         
(12a) 
 From equation (12a), a VAR Model with j lags can be expressed as; 
yt = α1yt-1+ α2yt-2 +…+ αjyt-j + µt                                                                                                                                    (12b) 
 
4.2 Fiscal Federalism and Inflation rate 
 There is evidence to suggest that monetary expansion will lead to 
increased inflation (Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005). Following this, we express 
inflation as a function of money supply. 
INF = f(MS)                                                                                                                       (13) 
 The model assumes that there are two sectors, private P and public G 
whose output depends on labour (L) and capital (K), and that there is a 
negative relationship between output and price movement (inflation rate). 
Following this, the study postulates that labour and capital have an impact on 
price level (inflation).There is evidence to suggest that factor productivity 
tends to impact positively on price level (inflation rate). Equation (13) 
becomes: 
INF = f(MSt  ,Lt , Kt)                                                                                                          (14) 
 There are links between decentralization and inflation (Brandt and 
Zhu, 2000; Jin et al. 1999; Lardy, 1998; Naughton, 1995; Yussuf, 1994). By 
introducing fiscal decentralization (FDC) as a policy variable into the model 
equation (14) becomes: 
INF = f(MSt , Lt , Kt , FDCt)                                                                                              (15) 
 Equation (15) is the estimated basic inflation equation. Its explicit 
form is; 
INF = β 0 + β 1MSt + β 2Lt + β 3Kt + β 4FDCt + µ t                                                      (16a) 
 From equation (16a) a VAR model with j lags can be expressed as; 
INFt = β1INFt-1+ β2INFt-2 +…+ βjINFt-j + µt                                                                      (16b)  
 
4.3 Fiscal Federalism and Exchange rate 
 The model assumes a flexible exchange rate determined by market 
forces (Ige 2006, Afolabi, 1999). In addition, the study postulates that 
exchange rate (EXC) will be negatively affected by inflation and increase in 
money supply, and therefore states that: 
EXC = f (INF, MS)                                                                                                            (17) 
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 The study assumes that the size of government tends to influence 
exchange rate, and that fiscal decentralization has a negative correlation with 
the size of government. This implies that increase in decentralization would 
reduce the size of government. Theoretically, fiscal decentralization may 
have a negative impact on exchange rate if there is lack of fiscal discipline at 
sub national levels of government. By introducing fiscal decentralization 
(FDC) as a policy variable into the model, equation (17) becomes, 
EXC = f(INFt , MSt , Gt)                                                                                                    (18) 
EXC = f(INFt , MSt , FDCt)                                                                                               (19) 
 Equation (19) is deduced from (18) on the basis of the argument 
above that size of G depends to a certain degree on FDC. Equation (19) is the 
estimated basic exchange rate equation. Its explicit form is: 
EXC = δ 0 + δ 1INFt + δ 2MSt + δ 3FDCt +µ t                                                               (20a) 
 From equation (20a) a VAR model with j lags can be expressed as; 
EXCt = δ1EXCt-1 + δ2EXCt-2 +…+ δjEXCt-j+ µt                                                                                               (20b) 
 
4.4 Fiscal Federalism and Interest rate 
 According to the Keynesian School of thought, interest rate is a 
monetary phenomenon, determined solely by demand and supply of money. 
To the Classical School, interest rate varies inversely with demand for 
money and directly with supply of money. The inverse relationship between 
interest rate and demand for money has implication for the level of savings. 
The study postulates that the level of savings in the economy is positively 
affected by interest rate, which is high interest rate correlates with high level 
of savings and vice-versa. The functional relationship is stated as follows: 
INT = f (MS, TDS)                                                                                                           (21) 
 There is evidence that price level (inflation) influences interest rate 
(Ige, 2006). By introducing inflation into the model, equation (21) becomes: 
INT = f (MSt , TDSt , INFt)                                                                                              (22) 
 The study assumes that the size of government influences interest 
rate, and that fiscal decentralization has a negative correlation with the size 
of government (Aigbokhan, 1999; Ehdaie 1994). Theoretically fiscal 
decentralization may have a negative impact on interest rate if there is lack 
of fiscal discipline at sub national level, and how fiscal imbalances are 
financed (Chete 1998). By introducing fiscal decentralization (FDC) as a 
policy variable into the model, equation (22) becomes: 
INT = f(MSt ,TDSt , INFt , Gt)                                                                                          (23) 
INT = f(MSt , TDSt , INFt , FDCt)                                                                                    (24) 
 Equation (24) is deduced from (23) on the basis of the argument 
above that the size of G depends to a certain degree on FDC. Equation (24) is 
the estimated basic interest rate equation. Its explicit form is: 
INT = λ 0 +λ 1MSt +λ 2TDSt +λ 3INFt +λ 4FDCt +µ t                                                  (25a) 
 From equation (25a), a VAR model with j lags can be expressed as; 
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INTt = λ1INTt-1+ λ2INTt-2+…+ λjINTt-j+ µt                                                                                                         (25b) 
 
4.5 Model Specification 
 The empirical models of this study are derived from the theoretical 
framework discussed in section 4. The empirical models are grouped into 
four sets of equations comprising of Growth equations (Model 26-29), 
Inflation equations (Model 30-33), Exchange rate equations (Model 34-37), 
and Interest rate equations (Model 38-42). The interaction of the variables in 
the model will have important implications for both estimation and 
interpretation of the model’s parameters. Data analysis was done using a 
Vector Autoregressive technique. The models are presented below. 
 
4.5.1     Model 1: The Growth-Decentralization Model 
 The tests are based on the regressions 
Δyt=α0+α1yt-1+∑ ∝Lj=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔLt-j+∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔKt-j+∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC1t-j  + µt                  (26) 
Δyt=β0+β1yt-1+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔLt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔKt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC2t-j + µt                  (27) 
Δyt =δ0+δ1yt-1+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔLt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔKt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC3t-j + µt                  (28) 
Δyt =λ0 + λ1yt-1 + ∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j +∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 2 ΔLt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔKt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC1t-j+ ∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 6ΔFDC2t-j + µt 
(29) 
 Where y is real gross domestic product (RGDP), Δ stands for the first 
difference, and L is the maximum lag length. Model 1 is intended to find out 
the influence of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, and to test the 
hypothesis that fiscal federalism does not significantly influence growth. 
 
4.5.2     Model 2: The Inflation Rate-Decentralization Model 
 The tests are based on the regressions 
Δyt=α0+α1yt-1+∑ ∝𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔMSt-j+∑ ∝𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔLt-j+∑ ∝𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔKt-j+∑ ∝𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC1t-j +µt                         (30) 
Δyt=β0+β1yt-1+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔLt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔKt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC2t-j+ µt                   (31) 
Δyt=δ0+δ1yt-1+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔLt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔKt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC3t + µt                                 (32) 
Δyt =λ0+λ1yt-1+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔKt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC1t-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC2t-j + µt             (33)  
 Where y is inflation rate (INF), Δ stands for first difference, and L is 
the maximum lag length. Model 2 is intended to find out the influence of 
fiscal decentralization on inflation rate, and to test the hypothesis that fiscal 
decentralization does not significantly influence inflation. 
 
4.5.3     Model 3: The Exchange Rate-Decentralization Model 
 The tests are based on the regressions; 
Δyt = α0+α1yt-1+∑ ∝𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j +∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔINFt-j+∑ ∝𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔMSt-j+∑ ∝𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC1t-j +µt                                                   (34) 
Δyt = β0+β1yt-1+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔINFt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC2t-j+µt                                     (35) 
Δyt = δ0+δ1yt-1+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 2 ΔINFt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC3t-j + µt                                    (36) 
Δyt=λ0+λ1yt-1+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔINFt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC1t-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC2t-1  + µt              (37) 
 Where y is exchange rate (EXC), Δ stands for first difference, and L 
is the maximum lag length. Model 3 is intended to find out the influence of 
fiscal decentralization on exchange rate, and to test the hypothesis that fiscal 
decentralization does not significantly influence exchange rate. 
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4.5.4   Model 4: The Interest Rate-Decentralization Model  
 The tests are based on the regressions; 
Δyt =α0+α1yt-1+∑ ∝𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔTDSt-j+∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC1t-j+∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔINFt-j + µt            (38) 
Δyt =β0+β1yt-1+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔTDSt-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC2t-j+∑ 𝛽𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔINFt-j+ µt              (39) 
Δyt =δ0+δ1yt-1+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔTDSt-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC3t-j+∑ 𝛿𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔINFt-j + µt              (40) 
Δyt =λ0+λ1yt-1+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔMSt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 3ΔTDSt-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC1t-j+∑ 𝜆𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔFDC2t-j+ µt             (41) 
Δyt = ή0+ή1yt-1+∑ ή𝐿𝑗=1 jΔyt-j+∑ ή𝐿𝑗=1 2ΔMSt-j+∑ ή𝐿𝑗=1  ΔFDC1t-j+∑ ή𝐿𝑗=1 4ΔFDC2t-j+∑ ή𝐿𝑗=1 5ΔINFt-j + ήt              (42) 
 Where y is interest rate (INT), Δ stands for first difference, and L is 
the maximum lag length. 
 Model 4 is intended to find out the influence of fiscal decentralization 
on interest rate, and to test the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization does not 
significantly influence interest rate. 
 
5.0   Empirical Findings and Discussion 
 This study employs three fiscal decentralization measures, sub 
national fiscal autonomy or  revenue measure (FDC1), sub national spending 
share or expenditure measure (FDC2), and  sub national dependency or 
simultaneity measure (FDC3) to determine the extent, and the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic performance in Nigeria over the 
study period 1980 to 2010 (See appendix table A for the summary statistics 
of data sources). The first two measures reflect the extent of decentralization 
of taxing, and expenditure responsibilities, while the third measure captures 
the simultaneous decentralization of both responsibilities. A pre-estimation 
analysis was carried out with a descriptive statistics to ascertain the 
normality status of the variables in the model. Two approaches was pursued. 
These include: probability and chi-square approach71.The descriptive 
statistics is presented in appendix table B.  
 
5.1 Stationarity Tests 
  The ADF test was carried out on the levels of the variables, and their 
differences to test for stationarity. Based on a regression of growth on a 
constant, lagged of RGDP, the test t-Statistic shows that there is no unit root; 
we therefore reject the null hypothesis that RGDP has a unit root. Hence we 
conclude that RGDP series has no unit root with a drift. A similar procedure 
leads to the conclusion that the inflation rate, exchange rate and interest rate 
series also has no unit root with a drift72. The results in Table 4 indicate that 
                                                          
71 It was found that five (5) out eleven (11) variables used in the model passed the normality 
test. These include: EXC,FDC2,FDC3, INT and L. Both the probability and chi square 
approach stipulated that the null hypothesis should not be rejected when the probability 
value is higher than 0.05 or when the Jarque-Bera value is less than 5.99.   
72 Inflation rate, exchange rate and interest rate are I (1) series. The unit root hypothesis is 
therefore rejected. 
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all variables (in their levels) are non stationary. Running ADF tests for 
change in variables indicate that some variables are integrated of order zero 
(1(0)) or one (1(1)).  
Table 4: Summary of Unit Root Test Result-ADF Statistics 
 Level First Difference  
Decision Variable Drift Drift & Trend Drift Drift & Trend 
EXC 0.0946 -1.9832 -5.1110* -5.1629** I(1) 
FDC1 -3.6160 -3.5396 -4.9828* -4.8958* I(1) 
FDC2 -0.9477 -1.5558 -6.1845 -6.6901* I(1) 
FDC3 -3.2252 -3.2951 -5.3803* -5.3078* I(1) 
INF -2.9445 -3.0506 -5.1358* -5.0956 I(1) 
INT -3.4259 -3.4914 -5.7654* -5.7136** I(1) 
K 4.7599 3.2856 -0.3541 -1.9735 I(0) 
L 7.2407 -0.9244 -0.7342 -2.0316* I(0) 
MS 2.6050 1.7022 -0.8736 -3.3229* I(1) 
RGDP 0.6156 -1.9846 -5.3517 -5.7497* I(1) 
TDS 2.3747 1.5665 0.3343 -1.0220* I(1) 
*,** indicates significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. The critical values for all 
models are as follows; (i) Levels - drift and drift and trend are -3.6793, -2.9678, -2.6230 and  
-4.3098, -3.5742, -3.2217 at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance in that order. (ii) First 
Differences - drift and drift and trend - are -3.6793, -2.9678, -2.9678 and -3.6999, -2.9763, -
2.6274 at the respective significance levels. 
Source: Computed from E-View 7.0 
 
5.2  Presentation of Estimated Empirical Results 
 The models estimated here have been augmented by a Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) representation. The VAR estimated results73 are 
reported in Table 5 to Table 8. The values of the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) for each basic series are similar for all VAR estimates. To 
see whether the results are sensitive to other conditioning factors, as well as 
to gauge the nature of the relation between overall fiscal operations and 
macroeconomic performance, the basic model for each series was re-
estimated including the first two measures (revenue measure FDC1, and 
expenditure measure FDC2) of decentralization. It would be recalled that 
these two measures reflect separate decentralization of taxing and spending 
powers. The third measure sub national dependency (FDC3) reflects 
simultaneity in decentralization of taxing and spending powers. 
 
5.2.1  Growth-Decentralization  
 VAR estimation for equations 26-29 in Growth model are reported in 
Table 5 below. The relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
73 VAR estimation for equations 26-42 are not included due to limited space available. 
However, this could be made available on request. 
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economic growth is analyzed using the three decentralization measures. The 
three measures of decentralization, revenue measure (FDC1), expenditure 
measure (FDC2), and simultaneity measure (FDC3) were found to be 
positive and highly significant at one per cent and five per cent in most cases 
for RGDP growth equations. The coefficients of revenue and expenditure 
measures show a consistent positive sign when the two decentralization 
measures are included as reported in the fourth column in Table 5. This 
result is consistent with the findings in similar studies in China (Feltenstein 
and Iwata, 2005), United States of America (Akai, 2002; Ram, 1986, 
Rodden, 2001), and Canada (Boadway, 1992). However, it contradicts the 
finding on Nigeria by Aigbokhan (1999) that decentralization has a negative 
impact on economic growth. The difference in the finding of these studies 
and that of Aigbokhan (1999) could be due to difference in the scope of the 
study.  
 The growth-decentralization model include three control variables, 
money supply (MS), labour (L), and capital (K) and they have signs 
predicted by theory. Labour input produced a positive significant impact, at 
one per cent level, on economic growth in Nigeria over the study period. 
Expectedly capital input is positively signed and significant at five per cent 
level. Capital input is thus a major driver of economic growth in Nigeria. 
Also money supply is positively signed but is insignificant. Adjusted 
coefficient of determination shows that variations in GDP are sufficiently 
explained by the variables included in the growth models. On the basis of 
estimation results of the growth models the null hypothesis is rejected, and 
the alternative hypothesis that fiscal decentralization has a significant effect 
on growth is accepted. 
 
Table 5 : Estimated Empirical Results in Growth-Decentralization 
Model 1 
Dependent variable RGDP 
Regressors                    1                           2                         3                            4 
RGDP(-1)              0.6597**                 0.6237*              0.6506**                 0.6667**                                     
                               (2.5029)                (2.3837)            (2.5649)                  (2.9757) 
RGDP(-2)              0.3891*                  0.0537**            0.2977**                  0.3025         
                               (1.2901)                (0.1765)            (0.9780)                  (1.0880)  
L(-1)                       0.0540                  0.0338               0.0534                     0.0141                                       
                               (1.4905)                (0.5100)            (1.3823)                  (0.2499) 
L(-2)                       0.0565                   0.0337              0.0558                     0.0133 
                               (1.5071)                (0.4939)            (1.3974)                  (0.2278) 
 K(-1)                     0.0026*                  0.0082               0.0024                    0.0144** 
                               (0.0882)                (0.2895)             (0.0795)                 (0.7923)    
K(-2)                       0.0010*                0.0142                0.0033                    0.0131* 
                               (0.0294)                (0.4911)             (0.1081)                (0.6928)  
MS(-1)                   0.0063                   0.0033                0.0066                        - 
                               (0.7330)                (0.3720)             (0.7503)                      - 
MS(-2)                   0.0031*                 -0.0025*              0.0028                        - 
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                               (0.3393)                (-0.2545)            (0.3028)                      - 
FDC1(-1)               45004.31*                    -                         -                      74948.35* 
                               (0.4428)                       -                        -                       (0.79881) 
FDC1(-2)               108711.5**                   -                        -                      126478.3** 
                               (1.0293)                       -                        -                      (1.31294) 
FDC2(-1)                   -                         13686.99**              -                      (5036.253)* 
                                   -                        (0.31575)                -                       (0.12565) 
FDC2(-2)                   -                        80004.31*                 -                      90674.76* 
                                   -                        (1.6609)                   -                      (2.11808) 
FDC3(-1)                   -                                -                  17889.27**                 - 
                                   -                                -                  (0.1251)                      - 
FDC3(-2)                   -                                -                  144133.2*                   -             
                                   -                                -                  (1.03380)                    - 
C                            -62576.45              -48844.25          -51749.46             -92638.06 
                               (-1.8277)               (-1.62712)          (-1.5209)              (-3.76556) 
 
Observations               31                           31                       31                         31 
Adj. R2                     0.94                        0.95                    0.94                       0.95 
F- Statistic              48.1405                 49.6600             46.4641                58.5765 
Log-Likelihood     -304.4167              -303.9821          -304.9118             -301.6650 
Akaike AIC            21.75287               21.72290           21.78702               21.56311 
 
Source: Computed from E-View 7.0 
         Notes    Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
           *5% level of significance ;  **1% level of significance 
 
5.2.2  Inflation Rate-Decentralization  
 VAR estimation for equations 30-33 are reported in Table 6. The 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and inflation rate is analyzed 
using the three measures of decentralization, revenue measure (FDC1), 
expenditure measure (FDC2), and simultaneity measure (FDC3). The three 
measures of decentralization were found to be positively related with 
inflation rate but insignificant at one per cent and five per cent level. The 
coefficients of the lagged values of revenue and expenditure decentralization 
measures have a positive sign and are statistically insignificant. 
 The coefficient of the simultaneity measure of decentralization 
(FDC3) has a consistent positive sign in the first and second lagged period 
and it is also insignificant. The positive correlation between fiscal 
decentralization and inflation supports the view that fiscal decentralization 
may lead to inflation. This finding is similar to the findings of Feltenstein 
and Iwata (2005), and Boadway (1990) which emphasized that that fiscal 
decentralization has adverse implication on the rate of inflation. Also in 
Table 6, the coefficients of revenue and expenditure measures of 
decentralization are positively signed when the two decentralization 
measures are included in the inflation rate-decentralization model. However 
they are not significant. On the basis of this findings, we therefore concludes 
that fiscal decentralization have adverse implications for the rate of inflation, 
and this may be due to inadequacies in the financial system. These models 
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include three control variables, money supply (MS), labour (L), and capital 
(K). Money supply produced a positive and significant impact, at one per 
cent level, on inflation rate in Nigeria over the study period. This result is not 
surprising as it confirms that inflation is more of a monetary phenomenon in 
Nigeria. Expectedly labour input is negatively signed but is not significant. 
Also expectedly capital is positively signed and significant at one per cent 
and five per cent level. Adjusted coefficient of determination indicates that 
variations in inflation are not sufficiently explained by the variables included 
in the model. Thus the model thus not has a good fit. 
Table 6 : Estimated Empirical Results in Inflation-Decentralization 
Model 2 
Dependent Variable INF 
Regressors                             1                         2                       3                              4 
INF(-1)                           0.6074**               0.5727**           0.6238**                 0.7334**           
                                        (2.6697)               (2.3070)           (2.8041)                 (3.3532)  
INF(-2)                            -0.4029*              -0.2055*           -0.4456                   -0.2705*       
                                        (-1.7927)             (-0.9543)           (-1.9997)               (-1.1169) 
MS(-1)                            4.07E-07             1.58E-06           1.44E-07               2.04E-06 
                                       (0.0334)               (0.1228)           (0.0121)                 (0.1850) 
MS(-2)                            1.23E-06             6.10E-07           1.72E-06               7.84E-07 
                                       (0.0955)               (0.0469)            (0.1371)                (0.0617) 
L(-1)                               0.0001*                8.28E-05*          0.0001*                      - 
                                       (1.8433)                (0.8681)            (2.0126)                    -             
L(-2)                              -0.0001*               -8.59E-05*        -0.0001                      -    
                                       (-1.8429)              (-0.8751)            (-2.0122)                  - 
K(-1)                              6.48E-06              5.37E-06            5.93E-06                -9.77E-06 
                                       (0.2175)               (0.1776)             (0.2043)                 (-0.3888) 
K(-2)                              1.25E-05              1.81E-05            1.42E-05                3.52E-06 
                                       (0.3569)               (0.5301)             (0.4167)                 (0.1109) 
FDC1(-1)                        68.4605                      -                        -                       110.3670 
                                       (0.4794)                       -                        -                       (0.7607) 
FDC1(-2)                       148.2641                     -                       -                        106.2776                
                                       (0.9784)                      -                       -                        (0.6967) 
FDC2(-1)                             -                     85.1643                    -                        66.0218 
                                             -                     (1.5215)                   -                        (1.0878) 
FDC2(-2)                             -                     75.5880                   -                         101.3343 
                                                                   (1.0018)                  -                         (1.9521) 
FDC3(-1)                             -                           -                    161.2969                        - 
                                             -                           -                    (0.8313)                         - 
FDC3(-2)                            -                       -                         295.2601                       - 
                                                                                               (1.4246)                        -       
C                               66.7557                 62.7425                  66.9013                   24.4516 
                                 (1.6563)                 (1.6498)                 (1.7434)                   (1.0880) 
Observations                  31                         31                            31                           31 
Adj.R2                      0.2455                   0.3077                     0.2861                     0.2625 
F-Statistic                1.9112                    2.2447                    2.1222                     1.9969 
Log-Likelihood       -114.7159              -113.4679               -113.9139                -114.3849 
Akaike AIC             8.6701                    8.5840                    8.6148                     8.6472 
   
 Source: Computed from E-View 7.0                   
  Notes    Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
           *5% level of significance ;  **1% level of significance 
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5.2.3  Exchange Rate-Decentralization   
 VAR estimation results for equations 34-37 are reported in Table 7. 
The three measures of decentralization, revenue measure, expenditure 
measure, and simultaneity are positively correlated with exchange rate in 
Nigeria but are insignificant at one per cent, and five per cent. The 
coefficients of the lagged values of the revenue and expenditure 
decentralization measures of decentralization (FDC1, FDC2) are positive and 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient of the lagged values of simultaneity 
measure of decentralization (FDC3) is also positive insignificant. The 
positive correlation between fiscal decentralization and exchange rate shows 
clearly that fiscal decentralization often leads to exchange rate depreciation 
but its effect is not significant. Decentralization coefficients of the lagged 
values of the revenue and simultaneity measures of decentralization (FDC1 
and FDC3) have a consistent positive sign in the first and second lagged 
period and are statistically insignificant. For the expenditure decentralization 
measure (FDC2) its coefficient has a positive sign in the first lagged period 
and then a negative sign in the second lagged period and it is also 
insignificant. The positive signs of the coefficient of revenue, expenditure 
and simultaneity measures of decentralization (FDC1, FDC2 and FDC3) 
show that fiscal decentralization will lead to depreciation of the exchange 
rate.  
 The transmission mechanism of fiscal decentralization and 
macroeconomic performance explains why decentralization might lead to a 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Fiscal decentralization is intended to shift 
tax revenues from the central government to sub national governments. Sub 
national governments infused with new revenue, begin to build local 
infrastructure. This infrastructure encourages both public and private 
investment. Private firms tend to respond to the increased local infrastructure 
with higher rates of investment than the public enterprises, given their 
greater efficiency. As the public enterprises attempt to keep up with the rates 
of investment of private enterprises, a further adjustment occurs. The public 
enterprises, observing the increased rate of capital formation of the private 
enterprises increase their own rate of investment beyond the rate that would 
be optimal. The public enterprises are able to do so because they have access 
to bank loans that are not justified on economic grounds. Also the private 
enterprises increase their borrowing to expand business operations because 
of the improvement in local infrastructure. The resulting monetary expansion 
leads to depreciation of the exchange rate. 
 This model include two control variables, inflation (INF) and money 
supply (MS), and their signs conform to a priori expectation. Expectedly, 
inflation is positively signed and significant at five per cent level. The 
implication of this finding is that increase in inflation would lead to a 
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depreciation of the exchange rate. Money supply is positively signed and 
significant at one per cent level. Adjusted coefficient of determination shows 
that variations in exchange rate are sufficiently explained by variables 
included in the exchange rate model. 
Table 7: Estimated Empirical Results in Exchange rate-Decentralization 
Model 3 
Dependent Variable 
Regressors                          1                                2                                3                                4 
EXC(-1)                      1.0631**                      0.9497**                  1.0310*                      0.9636*                 
                                    (4.5431)                      (3.9569)                  (4.4950)                    (3.6049) 
EXC(-2)                      -0.0940**                     0.0389**                  -0.0782*                     0.0378** 
                                    (-0.3991)                     (0.1463)                 (-0.3374)                    (0.1266) 
INF(-1)                        0.0151*                        0.0481                   0.0677**                     0.0034   
                                     (0.0708)                     (0.2540)                 (0.3179)                     (0.0167)             
INF(-2)                         0.1694*                       0.2042*                  0.1363**                    0.2703* 
                                     (0.8077)                      (0.9556)                 (0.6335)                   (1.1084)  
MS(-1)                         1.08E-05                     9.29E-06                1.03E-05                   9.42E-06 
                                     (1.1263)                     (1.0316)                  (1.0800)                    (1.0001) 
MS(-2)                         1.42E-05                     1.04E-05               1.34E-05                   1.04E-05 
                                     (1.0791)                     (0.8382)                 (1.0232)                    (0.7917) 
FDC1(-1)                     87.6915                            -                                -                         67.8870 
                                     (0.6201)                           -                                -                         (0.4634) 
FDC1(-2)                     17.9485                           -                                -                         118.4612   
                                     (0.1313)                         -                                -                          (0.8118) 
FDC2(-1)                            -                            4.2348                            -                        3.6966 
                                            -                           (0.0704)                          -                        (0.0501) 
FDC2(-2)                            -                            61.0053                         -                        -66.7879 
                                            -                           (1.2547)                         -                         (-1.2992) 
FDC3(-1)                            -                                  -                        14.2322                          - 
                                            -                                  -                        (0.0731)                        - 
FDC3(-2)                            -                                  -                         118.5471*                       -             
                                            -                                  -                         (0.6601)                          -  
C                                   6.8806                        30.1711                     6.8352                     36.8482 
                                     (0.7491)                      (1.9777)                    (0.7498)                   (1.4341) 
Observations                      31                                31                             31                             31 
Adj. R2                          0.9282                        0.9375                       0.9288                     0.9331 
F-Statistic                      46.2712                     53.5333                     46.6777                   40.0717 
Log Likelihood             -115.4714                  -113.4587                  -115.3510                -112.9198 
Akaike AIC                   8.5842                       8.4454                        8.5759                     8.5462 
  
Computed from E-View 7.0            
Notes    Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
           *5% level of significance;   **1% level of significance 
                    
 
5.2.4  Interest Rate-Decentralization   
 VAR estimation results for equations 38-42 in interest rate-
decentralization model 4 are reported in Table 8. The three measures of 
decentralization, revenue measure (FDC1), expenditure measure (FDC2), 
and simultaneity measure (FDC3) are positively correlated with interest rate 
but not significant at one per cent and five per cent level as shown in Table 
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8. The coefficients of the lagged values of revenue and simultaneity 
measures of decentralization (FDC1 and FDC3) in columns (1,3,4 and 5) are 
positive but do not significantly influence interest rate. For the lagged values 
of the expenditure decentralization measure (FDC2) its coefficient is also 
positive and not significant. The positive signs of the coefficients of the 
lagged values of decentralization measures confirm that fiscal 
decentralization will lead to increase in the interest rate. In columns 4 and 5 
of Table 8, the coefficients of the lagged values of revenue and expenditure 
measures of decentralization (FDC1 and FDC2) are also positive but not 
significant when the two measures were introduced into the interest rate 
model reported in columns 4 and 5 . The finding of a positive correlation 
between fiscal decentralization and interest rate confirms that fiscal 
decentralization may lead to increase in interest rate due to inadequacies in 
the financial system. 
 These models include three control variables money supply (MS), 
total domestic savings (TDS), and inflation (INF), and they conform to a 
priori expectation. Expectedly money supply is negatively signed and 
significant at five per cent level. Total domestic savings is positively signed 
and significant at one percent level. Inflation produced a negative significant 
impact, at one per cent level on interest rate in Nigeria over the study period. 
Adjusted coefficients of determination show that variations in interest rate 
are sufficiently explained by variables included in the interest rate models. 
On the basis of estimation results of interest rate-decentralization models the 
null hypothesis that fiscal decentralization does not significantly influence 
interest rate is accepted as the study revealed a positive and insignificant 
correlation between the three measures of fiscal decentralization and interest 
rate in Nigeria over the study period. 
Table 8: Estimated Empirical Results in Interest Rate-Decentralization 
Model 4 
Dependent  Variable INT 
Regressors                                   1                                2                                 3                           4                           5     
INT(-1)                               0.2063**                    -0.1514*                      0.2096**                  0.2557**                 0.0058** 
                                            (0.5772)                    (-0.3892)                    (0.5928)                  (1.0832)                (0.0157) 
INT(-2)                               -0.2802**                  -0.3174*                      -0.3035*                  -0.0239*                -0.1014* 
                                            (0.8460)                    (0.8031)                     (-0.8910)                (-0.0865)               (-0.2617)             
MS(-1)                               -5.70E-08*                 -1.02E-06*                  -1.42E-08*              -6.31E-07*            -1.50E-07* 
                                            (-0.0488)                  (-0.8490)                    (-0.0122)                (-0.5236)                (-0.3499) 
MS(-2)                               -3.19E-07                  -5.87E-07                   -2.13E-07                 6.28E-07              1.47E-07* 
                                            (-0.2807)                  (-0.5353)                    (-0.2135)                  (0.5666)                (0.2537) 
TDS(-1)                              4.51E-07                  2.22E-06                     3.79E-07                1.23E-06                   -          
                                            (0.1812)                  (0.8931)                      (0.1534)                 (0.5050)                     - 
TDS(-2)                               5.39E-07*                1.45E-06*                   2.72E-07*               1.63E-06*                    - 
                                            (0.1897)                   (0.5283)                     (0.0952)                 (0.5756)                     - 
FDC1(-1)                            2.1315                            -                                    -                      0.0667                    1.0051       
                                            (0.3102)                          -                                   -                      (0.0101)                 (0.1498) 
FDC1(-2)                            0.4367*                           -                                    -                      4.1211                   2.3142      
                                            (0.0640)                         -                                    -                      (0.5842)                 (0.3341)   
FDC2(-1)                                  -                           4.9330                               -                       4.6918                   4.4019 
                                                  -                          (1.7836)                            -                       (1.4832)                 (1.4563)   
FDC2(-2)                                  -                          1.5255                                -                       2.8209*                  2.2739   
                                                  -                          (0.5186)                             -                       (0.9908)                 (0.7520) 
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FDC3(-1)                                  -                               -                                2.1387                      -                             -     
                                                  -                               -                                (0.2210)                   -                             -  
FDC3(-2)                                  -                               -                                5.3979                       -                             - 
                                                  -                               -                                (0.5987)                    -                             -  
INF(-1)                               -0.0085                      -0.0193                         -0.0104                      -                        -0.0157 
                                           (-0.5343)                    (-1.2377)                      (-0.6595)                    -                        (-0.9962)   
INF(-2)                               0.0007*                      -0.0054**                       0.0016**                     -                        -0.0004                                
                                           (0.0512)                     (-0.3635)                       (0.1055)                      -                       (-0.0260)  
C                                         1.1948                        3.1746                           1.2342                    1.5425                 2.4099         
                                           (1.6284)                      (1.8885)                        (1.7024)                 (1.6467)               (1.4895)  
Observations                           31                                31                                 31                           31                         31 
Adj. R2                                0.811                          0.821                            0.8103                    0.7801                  0.8014  
F-Statistic                            15.012                        15.912                          15.410                    13.910                  14.5010      
Log-Likelihood                  -79.410                      -78.551                         -79.038                   -82.632                -79.946 
Akaike AIC                         5.318                         5.268                             5.296                      5.448                    5.349      
Source: Computed from E-View 7.0 
Notes    Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
           *5% level of significance ,     **1% level of significance 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
 The question of whether fiscal decentralization challenges could be 
responsible for poor macroeconomic performance in Nigeria has been 
extensively investigated in this study. The application of the Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) estimator with lagged decentralization variables to a 
set of dynamic time series data models has proved quite intuitive, robust, and 
immensely suitable.  
 The results presented in this study clearly show how fiscal 
decentralization impacted on macroeconomic performance in Nigeria and it 
equally provides a menu of policy options to be employed to address the 
question of underperformance relating to fiscal decentralization. The study 
suggests that faster economic growth may constitute additional benefit of 
fiscal decentralization beyond those already well recognized. The study also 
show that the practice of fiscal federalism in Nigeria has been inhibited by a 
number of factors, chief of which is long years of military rule from 1966 to 
1999 that led to the centralization of fiscal operations. Besides, the study also 
reveals a limited degree of fiscal decentralization in Nigeria. Another 
striking finding in this study is the fact that fiscal decentralization is good for 
growth and bad for development. 
 Decentralization and financial autonomy are essential features of 
fiscal federalism. Sub national governments need to be given access to 
adequate resources to effectively do the job with which they are entrusted. At 
the same time they must also be accountable for what they do with the 
resources. To achieve the relevant policy objectives that relate to ensuring a 
stable fiscal federalism, questions on how to organize intergovernmental 
fiscal systems should be pragmatically addressed. These objectives include 
efficient allocation of resources, income distribution and macroeconomic 
stabilization. The attainment of these objectives will ensure macroeconomic 
stability. Finally, all policy changes proposed to address the challenges of 
fiscal federalism must be vigorously pursued so that macroeconomic stability 
is not jeopardized in the short and long run. 
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Appendix Table A: Summary of Definition of Variables and Data 
Sources 
Variable Definition Source of Data 
Fiscal decentralization 
measure of revenue 
decentralization (FDC1) 
Sub national own-source (internally 
generated) revenue as a ratio of total 
central (federal) revenue. Reflects the 
decentralization of taxing power 
CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Fiscal decentralization 
measure of expenditure 
decentralization (FDC2) 
Sub national expenditure as a ratio of 
total federal expenditure. Reflects the 
decentralization of spending power 
CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Fiscal decentralization 
measure of simultaneous  
decentralization of taxing 
and spending powers 
FDC3 
 
Sub national own-source (internally 
generated) revenue as a ratio of total 
federal expenditure. Capture the 
simultaneous decentralization of both 
powers. 
CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
Real Gross Domestic 
Product (RGDP) 
The broadest quantitative measure of 
a nation’s total economic activity. It 
measures, in constant (2000 naira) 
prices, the value of economic activity 
within Nigeria’s geographic borders, 
including all final goods and services 
produced over a period of time 
(usually a year). 
World Bank (2010), Africa 
development indicator online 
Inflation rate (INF) This is the annual percentage change 
in consumer price index (CPI) 
World Bank (2010), Africa 
development indicator online 
Real Exchange rate (EXC) Exchange rate index represents the 
relative importance of naira to all 
other currencies 
World Bank (2010), Africa 
development indicator online 
Real Interest rate (INT) Real interest rate is the lending 
interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the gross domestic 
product (GDP) deflator. 
World Bank (2010), Africa 
development indicator online. 
Money Supply (MS) Money supply is the sum of currency 
in circulation and demand deposit 
(M1) at the end of period (usually a 
year). 
CBN Statistical Bulletin (2008) 
Total Domestic Savings 
(TDS) 
 
 
Total savings deposit of commercial 
banks, mortgage banks, investment 
and property development 
corporation (M3). 
CBN Statistical Bulletin (2008) 
Labour force (L) Total labour force, also called the 
economically active population, 
“comprises all persons of either sex 
who furnish the supply of labour for 
the production of economic goods 
and services.” Labour force includes 
people ages 15 and older who meet 
the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) definition of the economically 
active population 
World Bank (2010), Africa 
development indicator online 
Stock of physical capital 
input (K) 
Stock of physical capital input per 
worker. The proxy for this variable is 
the gross fixed capital formation. 
CBN Statistical Bulletin (2010) 
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Appendix Table B: Descriptive Statistics 
 EXC FDC1 FDC2 FDC3 INF INT K L MS RGDP TDS 
 Mean  54.31850  0.041967  0.387185  0.041800 20.53452  0.923040  513837.2  59632727  1900192.  92164.48  831644.8 
 Median  21.88610  0.039265  0.415766  0.047910 12.10000  0.726260  141920.2  58162391  318763.5  70832.89  108490.3 
 Maximum  150.2980  0.128704  0.575271  0.084579 72.80000  2.727270  2779966.  85213028  14043681  187332.5  6418259. 
 Minimum  0.546358  0.003603  0.194160  0.001833 5.400000  0.185440  8799.500  39918460  15100.00  47839.60  5769.900 
 Std. Dev.  58.13253  0.027156  0.128313  0.021594 17.95044  0.703835  780153.4  13950289  3533882.  45896.52  1613270. 
 Skewness  0.509169  1.080700  0.108307 
-
0.295053  1.438239  0.962607  1.714406  0.265322  2.313869  1.103324  2.363539 
 Kurtosis  1.435350  4.768159  1.418783  2.789439 4.035096  3.041639  4.720315  1.825682  7.373061  2.729506  7.549471 
 Jarque-Bera  4.501644  10.07246  3.290094  0.507058 12.07134  4.789740  19.00847  2.144948  52.36366  6.384010  55.59715 
 Probability  0.105313  0.006498  0.193004  0.776057 0.002392  0.091185  0.000075  0.342161  0.000000  0.041089  0.000000 
 Sum  1683.874  1.300972  12.00274  1.295792 636.5700  28.61426  15928953  1.85E+09  58905956  2857099.  25780988 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  101381.7  0.022123  0.493929  0.013989 9666.544  14.86152  1.83E+13  5.84E+15  3.75E+14  6.32E+10  7.81E+13 
 Observations  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31  31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
